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Abstract
In the exclusive use model of spectrum trading, cognitive radio devices or sec-
ondary users can buy spectrum resources from licensed users or primary users
for a short or long period. Considering such spectrum access, a trading model
is introduced where a buyer can select a set of candidate sellers based on their
reputation and their offer in fulfilling its requirements, namely, offered signal
quality, contract duration, coverage and bandwidth. Similarly, a seller assesses
a buyer as a potential trading partner considering its reliability, which the seller
can derive from the buyer’s reputation and financial profile. In our scheme, seller
reputation or buyer reliability can be either obtained from a reputation broker-
age service, if exists, or calculated using our model. Since in the competitive
market, the price of a seller depends on that of other sellers, game theory is used
to model the competition among multiple sellers. An optimization technique is
used by a buyer to select the best seller(s) and optimize purchase to maximize
its utility, which may result in buying from multiple sellers, of certain amount
of bandwidth from each, depending on price, fulfilling requirements and bud-
get constraints. Stability of the model is analyzed and performance evaluation
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shows that it benefits both sellers and buyers in terms of profit and throughput,
respectively.
Keywords: Cognitive radio networks, spectrum trading, reputation,
recommendations, game theory.
2010 MSC: 00-01, 99-00
1. Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) enabled devices termed as secondary users (SUs) can
solve the problem of spectrum scarcity [1, 2] in the unlicensed band by sharing
the under-utilized licensed band with the licensed or primary users (PUs). This
spectrum sharing has been categorized in three models - commons, shared-use5
and exclusive-use models [3]. Commons model is applied in unlicensed bands
(e.g. ISM bands) where spectrum can be accessed by everyone and hence, be-
coming congested due to the increased usage and number of wireless devices. In
shared-use model, SUs sense the licensed spectrum to exploit it opportunisti-
cally i.e., they use the licensed spectrum when it is not used by PUs. Although10
SUs can access the spectrum without any cost in this model, it has several lim-
itations [4, 5]. For example, continuous sensing and careful deployment of SUs
are required, communication overhead increases and finding and switching to a
free channel may become difficult because spectrum holes may not be always
available.15
On the other hand, exclusive-use model has several advantages and do not
suffer from the above mentioned limitations. In the exclusive-use model, SUs
have exclusive rights to access the spectrum by buying channels from primary
service providers, hereafter termed as primary services, for a shorter or longer
period of time without any need for spectrum sensing. Besides, SUs can buy20
the spectrum at a lower price and the primary services can make some profit by
selling their unused resources to the SUs, benefitting both the primary and the
secondary services. This type of spectrum access model between the primary
and the secondary services has been adopted in different contexts exploiting
2
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
different solution techniques [6–14].25
In [15], we introduced a spectrum trading model using exclusive-use model
where a buyer chooses a seller based on its reputation, service contract duration,
signal quality and bandwidth of the offered spectrum. But we did not consider
the reputation of buyers as seen from sellers’ perspective for trading purpose.
The consideration of a buyer’s reputation is also of paramount importance for a30
successful leasing based trading. Therefore, in this paper, we have incorporated
several aspects to elevate the trading of spectrum to a more realistic level.
First, we have introduced a buyer’s reputation and credit score which can be
used as criteria by a seller to assess the reliability of a buyer. This is essential
in buyer selection when the payments of the contract are in installments or in35
post-paid basis. Similar to [15], a buyer’s reputation is calculated based on a
seller’s own experience and recommendations from other sources. Experience
is calculated based on payment completion, timely payment and percentage of
contract completion of a spectrum lease. Trustworthiness of recommenders is
also considered important to reduce the impact of false recommendations.40
In the traditional credit rating system, there exist many agencies (e.g., Stan-
dard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings) who assess the creditworthiness of
a company or a government, while the others such as credit bureau and con-
sumer reporting agency collect and evaluate credit information of individual
consumers for applications such as bank loan, leasing, employment, etc. [16].45
Currently, there exists no reputation/reliability brokering service for spectrum
trading. However, with increased business opportunities of spectrum trading,
such brokering service is expected to become available in the future. Therefore,
in our model, we keep provisions for a seller to obtain the reliability score of a
buyer from either a broker or by the seller’s own analysis.50
Second, we consider competition among sellers and model this competition
using non-cooperative game theory to determine the Nash equilibrium trading
price. In [15], we assumed inherent competition among sellers, and therefore,
used market equilibrium to determine the supply and demand of the spectrum
bandwidth. In the case of multiple sellers and buyers, market equilibrium cal-55
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culates the combined supply of sellers as a single supply curve and that of the
buyers as a single demand curve. This was sufficient in [15] because sellers were
assumed to be unaware of the spectrum price of other sellers. But if sellers
are aware of the prices of other sellers and they compete with each other in
maximizing their own profits, and in such case non-cooperative game theory is60
the best candidate to model this price competition. Therefore, in this paper,
we use non-cooperative game theory to determine the pricing solution. Third,
we consider two types of buyers in the market: (i) price sensitive and (ii) price
insensitive. Price sensitive buyers are those who buy spectrum from sellers and
maximize its utility or satisfaction within its budget constraint. In contrast,65
price insensitive buyers are focused on buying their required bandwidth rather
than considering price as a constraint.
Thus, in the proposed model, a buyer and a seller will be aware of each
other to ensure successful trades. The major contributions of this paper can be
summarized as:70
• The selection of buyers is based on their reliability, which can be either
obtained from a broker or calculated by a seller considering the buyer’s
financial profile, seller’s own past trading experience and recommenda-
tions from other sources about that buyer. Experience is numerically
quantified utilizing payment completion, timely payment and percentage75
of completion of contract duration, while the creditworthiness of a buyer
is theoretically modeled using a generalized credit scoring model using
logistic regression.
• Introduction of competition among sellers and its theoretical model with
a non-cooperative game theory.80
• Modelling of two types of buyers, namely, price sensitive and insensitive
buyers, and their analytical solutions for required amount of bandwidth
purchase maximizing utility functions.
• Analysis of the proposed model against existing popular and recent models
4
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[15, 17] in terms of throughput and economic benefits.85
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related works of spectrum
trading using game theory are described in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
system model with the assumptions considered in this paper. Buyer selection
process is presented in Section 4. Section 5 represents competition among sellers,
while Section 6 describes the analytical solution used by a buyer in buying the90
spectrum. Performance evaluation is presented in Section 7 while Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Related Works
Spectrum trading had been applied to solve the pricing issue in network
models in different ways to reach the optimal and stable solution. These are [17]:95
auctioning, classical optimization, game theory and microeconomic approach.
In auctioning approach, trading is time-dependent where the bidding decision
is taken at a certain interval or at a fixed time. Optimization can be used in
spectrum trading to maximize or minimize an objective function of a seller or a
buyer under some constraints. This objective function can express a trading goal100
(e.g., maximum profit, minimum cost) in mathematical terms. Game theory is
used when a system exists with multiple entities with different objectives and
an equilibrium solution is desired rather than satisfying a single objective with
a global optimum solution.
A spectrum market is considered in [7] where the same seller is evaluated105
differently to various buyers based on their applications and locations. Stochas-
tic learning algorithm is used to find the optimal price in the presence of limited
information (e.g., buyer’s utility function and prices of other sellers) in order to
maximize the profit of the sellers. But the seller’s utility function for selecting
buyers is ignored in this work. As a result, sellers are unaware of the nature of110
demand from the buyers.
In the approach described in [18], PUs lease spectrum to SUs in exchange for
cooperation in the form of distributed space-time coding, instead of using any
5
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pricing model for remuneration. Game theory is used to model the competition
of the SUs to transmit to their respective receivers by performing power control.115
This model requires that the SUs will relay the data of the primary transmitters
to the primary receivers. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the SUs will
cooperate in relaying the data of the PUs. In [11], spectrum sharing among
multiple SUs and a single PU is considered. Non-cooperative game theory is
used to model the competition for bandwidth among the SUs. PU or seller120
then calculates the price based on the demand from the SUs or buyers. Here,
neither any competition nor cooperation is considered among the PUs. A two-
tier market was proposed in [19] for spectrum trading. In Tier-1, spectrum
is traded from PUs to SUs and Nash bargaining game is used to achieve the
fairness between the aggregated utility of all SUs and the utility of a PU. In Tier-125
2 market, spectrum is redistributed among SUs to meet their traffic demands.
Random matching and bilateral bargaining is used in this tier to obtain solution.
Only a single PU has been considered in this work.
In the approach introduced by Zhu et al. [20], competitive secondary ser-
vice providers lease spectrum from a spectrum broker. SUs select the service130
based on an evolutionary game and a differential game is used to model the
competition among the secondary providers. Here, SUs start by selecting the
providers randomly, and then the strategy with a higher payoff than the average
are replicated by other SUs. Replication is achieved by switching to different
providers frequently to reach an equilibrium solution, which is time consuming135
and too frequent switching makes the scheme unfeasible in real market.
In [21], multiple PUs sell spectrum to multiple SUs. SUs evolve over time to
buy spectrum resources which maximizes their payoff in terms of transmission
rate and price using the evolutionary game theory. Deterministic and stochastic
models of evolutionary game are used to model this evolution of SUs. Spectrum140
size and price are determined by the PUs and non-cooperative game theory is
used to model the competition among the PUs. All SUs’ net utility are assumed
to be the same in a group. It does not consider that each SU’s requirements
can vary from the others within a group. The authors assumed that all SUs
6
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within a group buy spectrum from the same PU and are allocated with the same145
spectrum size with the same price.
None of the existing works on spectrum trading including those that used
game theory considered reputation of sellers and buyers and their effects on
spectrum pricing. They also did not consider trustworthiness of recommenders.
Therefore, these works cannot portray the price dynamics of a real market.150
3. System Model
A network consisting of Ny primary services (e.g., spectrum sellers) and
Nx secondary services (e.g., spectrum buyers) are considered in the proposed
model as shown in Fig. 1. Each of the primary and secondary service serves
ny and nx number of primary (PUs) and secondary users (SUs), respectively.155
These primary services (e.g., TV and radio stations, telecommunication service
providers) who own some spectrum resources may sell unutilized portion of their
spectrum to secondary services (e.g., secondary base stations, ad hoc networks,
enterprise networks) who do not possess any spectrum license. Thus the primary
services can earn extra revenue and the secondary services can obtain guaranteed160
spectrum access with desired spectrum characteristics and requirements.
Buyers (i.e., secondary services) who wish to buy spectrum resources will
request price per unit bandwidth and other information of trading offer to the
sellers (i.e., primary services). Buyers will build or update their reputation
database about the sellers from the recommendations of the other buyers and165
their own experiences. Sellers will also calculate the reliability of buyers based
on their credit scoring and reputation. A seller will compete with other sellers in
determining spectrum price based on the demands from buyers. Buyers will then
buy spectrum resources from the sellers that maximize their utility functions
and satisfy their requirements.170
7
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Primary 
Service 1
Primary 
Service Np
Primary 
Service 2
Secondary 
Service 1
1 2
Lower 
utility
Higher 
utility
Primary Users
(PUs)
Secondary Users
(SUs)
Secondary 
Service NS
Figure 1: Network model for the spectrum trading between the primary and secondary service
providers.
4. Buyer Selection Process
Payment for the spectrum resources can be made in two ways: (i) prepaid
and (ii) postpaid or in installments (e.g., renting of satellite TV channels). In
prepaid transactions, buyers have to clear the payments before using the spec-
trum resources. However, buyers can pay the fees later in post-paid transactions.175
Thus in post-paid payment, sellers should check the eligibility of a buyer consid-
ering its past payment history and other related characteristics. This eligibility
checking is very common financial dealings (e.g., bank loans) where it is termed
as ‘credit scoring’. It is a method for classifying credit applicants into ‘good’
or ‘bad’ risk classes [22]. Although the credit assessment for bank loans or180
other similar loans are different from spectrum trading, the same idea of risk
assessment to provide lease to a spectrum buyer can be integrated to improve
financial security from a seller’s point of view. Furthermore, if there are high
demands for limited spectrum resources in the market, sellers would have the
opportunity to select a few from many buyers based on the credit scoring criteria185
along with other factors. Besides this credit scoring, the reputation of buyers is
8
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also considered in the selection process by a seller to provide priority to highly
reliable buyers.
Such reliability score can be obtained in two different ways. One way is
through a broker entity. As indicated in Section 1, brokers are the accepted,190
trusted and neutral entities in various business domains whom the trading part-
ners can rely on for providing scores and can make those publicly accessible or
provide on request. A seller y will obtain reliability score of buyers (e.g. buyer
x), termed as ℵxy from the broker. In absence of any such broker in a business
domain it is possible for a trading entity to calculate the reliability score of195
its partner in a transaction using its own past trading experience or collecting
information from other sources in a collaborative manner. To the best of our
knowledge, no reliability broker on spectrum trading currently exists in prac-
tice. In our proposed model, we have kept the provision of utilizing reliability
brokerage service if such broker comes into practice in future. In absence of bro-200
kerage service currently in spectrum trading, we develop the following model to
calculate reliability using the latter approach. Even in the presence of broker-
age, such model will be extremely useful in cases where the reliability score of a
particular entity is not currently available to broker or an entity prefers its own
assessment to that of a broker.205
We define the reliability of a buyer as a combination of its reputation and
credit score. The reliability of a buyer would be high if both its reputation and
credit score are high. This implies the need to use the product of reputation and
credit score to measure the reliability. In a study [23], the authors have shown
that reputation of a business has a linear relationship with reliability or other210
risk factors. Such linear relationship between reputation, reliability and other
factors are also supported by other studies such as [24]. In our paper, the credit
score and reputation covers two aspects by which a buyer can be assessed by a
seller and are detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Considering these two aspects,
the reliability of a buyer is defined as follows:215
ℵxy = pixy%xy, (1)
9
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where, ℵxy, pixy and %xy are the reliability score, credit score and reputation of
buyer x towards seller y, respectively. Buyer x is selected by seller y based on
a selection score which depends on the seller’s business policy.
4.1. Credit Scoring of Buyers
There are different methods for credit scoring. Hand and Henley in [22]220
compared different classification methods (e.g., discriminant analysis, linear re-
gression, logistic regression, genetic algorithms, neural networks) in consumer
credit scoring and found that all methods perform almost similar. The per-
formance (e.g., classification accuracy and speed) depends on the model’s data
structure and other characteristics. Among these methods, logistic regression is225
one of the most popular statistical tools for credit scoring. Unlike other tools
(e.g. discriminant analysis or ordinary linear regression), it can fit various kinds
of distribution functions (e.g. Poisson, binomial and normal distributions) and
also performs well in fraud detection [25]. Logistic regression has been exten-
sively used in credit scoring models [26–31] and is well suited to determine credit230
scoring of a spectrum buyer.
In the case of post-paid contract, buyers submit their information to a seller
and apply for a contract. The seller then assesses the risk involving this buyer.
In our approach, a seller employs a generalized credit scoring model using logistic
regression [32, 33]:235
pixy =
eB0+
∑n
i=1 BiXi
1 + eB0+
∑n
i=1 BiXi
, (2)
where, pixy represents the probability which approximates the credit score of
buyer x for seller y; Bi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) are the coefficients of the logistic regression
model and Xi are the interval scale variables (e.g. revenue and loan).
The required information of a buyer for credit score depends on the nature
or the objective of a business. For example, revenue, liability or loan and fixed240
asset can be considered to determine the credit score of a buyer. In that case,
if a buyer has a higher revenue, asset and lower loan, a seller will have a lower
probability of having an unsuccessful contract with this buyer.
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4.2. Reputation of Buyers
In [34], Liu and Issarny defined reputation as “Reputation of an agent is a245
perception regarding its behavior norms, which is held by other agents, based
on experiences and observation (i.e., indirect observation through peers’ rec-
ommendations) of its past actions.” They mentioned that reputation can be
assessed from the following two sources: i) own interaction experience of an
assessee with the assessed entity, and ii) recommendations from other peers or250
users who have interacted with the assessed entity. Therefore, reputation is a
perception of the trustworthiness of an entity based on one’s own experiences
and others’ recommendations [35]. Besides, reputation is dynamic in nature and
can evolve with time [36–38].
In economics, reputation is also defined as the expectation of quality of a255
product or service [39]. Reputation partially helps in building the loyalty of
customers [40, 41]. Thus, reputation can enhance the profitability of an orga-
nization because higher customer loyalty generates increased economic returns
[42]. Landon et al. [39] also found that reputation can determine the price of a
product.260
The reputation of a buyer to a seller is required if the service or product
is traded through a leasing contract. For other situations, such as prepaid
service contracts, buyer’s reputation is not significant. There are many postpaid
services available across the world. For online sales based on leasing, assessing
the reputation of a buyer is very crucial to reduce the risk of losing payments265
where there is no guarantee from a bank. Moreover, it is also important for a
trade where a guarantee is achieved from the bank based on conditions, such as
regular payments required in a fixed installment.
A seller can calculate the reputation of a buyer based on its own experience
and from recommendations from other sources (details on a variety of recom-270
menders is discussed in Section 4.2.1). Therefore, we define buyer x’s reputation
11
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to seller y from [15] as:
%xy =
ιxyζxy
ιxy +
∑Rx
j=1 ιxjφxj
+
∑Rx
j=1 ιxjφxjζxj
ιxy +
∑Rx
j=1 ιxjφxj
, (3)
where, ιxy is the confidence level of seller y on buyer x’s consistency in past
experiences; ιxj is the confidence level provided by recommender j towards x;
ζxy is the seller y’s own trading experience with x and ζxj is the recommen-275
dation from a recommender j; Rx is the number of recommenders for x whose
trustworthiness to seller y is greater than some predefined value and φxj is the
trustworthiness of recommender j for buyer x. A predefined value is used to
filter out recommenders who have lower trustworthiness to the seller. Therefore,
the first term of (3) implies a seller’s own experience and confidence level about280
a buyer, and the second term is the collection of recommenders’ confidence level
and experiences about the buyer.
To measure the confidence level ιxy about a buyer in trading with a seller, we
have used the standard deviation of past experiences. If a buyer gave different
experiences at different times, its standard deviation would be high, implying285
more risk to the seller. Therefore, the confidence level of that seller towards
this buyer should be lower. If T exy is the total number of trading experiences of
seller y with buyer x, ιxy can be calculated as:
ιxy =
1
1 +
√
1
T exy
∑T exy
t=1
(
ζxy(t)− ζ¯xy
)2 . (4)
If the seller y lacks any previous experience with the buyer x, ιxy is set to 0
and the seller will depend only on the recommendations from other sources. If290
the seller itself as well as the recommenders have no experience with that buyer,
%xy will be set to 0.5. In a similar way, the confidence level of a recommender
j, ιxj can be calculated.
Few questions may arise regarding the reputation system of buyers. First,
why is reputation system for buyers required? Second, why will the primary295
users bear the risk of default as there are other third parties (e.g., PayPal)
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who typically evaluate payer’s credit-worthiness and assume the corresponding
credit risks and management? Third, in which cases may sellers share selective
information of their buyers that serves the interest of the seller-community as a
whole?300
There are several compelling reasons for the inclusion of buyers’ reputation
in our system model which are discussed below. It is true that there exist
third parties such as PayPal who typically assess credit-worthiness of buyers
and bear the credit risks. But it is not applicable in all cases. PayPal and
most popular third parties provide protection when the items are tangible and305
shipped to physical addresses. According to PayPal, an item is tangible when it
can be held and shipped. Otherwise, it is intangible (e.g., service, eBooks, mp3,
etc.) [43]. In this definition, spectrum resources belong to intangible category.
Therefore, the spectrum sellers will not be protected from fraudulent buyers if
they rely only on these third parties. In these circumstances, the sellers require310
to manage and prevent the credit risks by themselves.
Besides, if a seller has protection from third parties, it has no need to share
buyer’s information to other sellers. But when a seller sells intangible items,
it is for its own interest to share the updated list of its blacklisted buyers to
other sellers so that every seller can protect itself from blacklisted buyers. This315
concept is already in practice among sellers. For most of the intangible items,
sellers share their bad user lists in forums, blogs, social networks and so on. An
example of such website is Badbuyerlist [44] where the sellers can get updated
list of blacklisted buyers submitted by seller community. Such sharing reduces
the risk for collusion and loss in the future by helping sellers in protecting320
themselves from fraudulent buyers.
Reputation of buyers is not only important in post-paid payments but also
in pre-paid ones. For example, when a buyer makes an online transaction using
a credit/debit card or third parties, he/she can claim a chargeback mainly for
two reasons [45]: i) when the credit card number is stolen and used fraudulently325
and ii) when the buyer bought an item but the seller failed to fulfill his agree-
ments (e.g., did not send the item or it was not as described). This chargeback
13
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timeframe can vary from weeks and even months after original transaction date.
For intangible items, most chargeback claims by buyers are not covered by third
parties. Therefore, reputation of buyers by sellers is extremely important for330
sellers who sell intangible items to protect themselves from future loss and hence
to increase the overall profit.
4.2.1. Experience Calculation
Experience ζxy is calculated by a seller from its trading experiences that
include but not limited to payment completion, timely payment and contract335
completion. This is because although a buyer may complete its payment, it may
not be timely and the buyer may also terminate its contract earlier. Therefore,
ζxy can be defined as:
ζcxy(t) =
1
2
ψxy(t)
(
sTxy(t) + s
D
xy(t)
)
, (5)
where, ζcxy(t) is the current experience; ψxy(t) is the payment completion func-
tion; sTxy(t) is the timely payment and s
D
xy(t) is the contract duration function.340
ψxy(t) and s
T
xy(t) can be respectively defined as:
ψxy(t) =
1 if completed0 otherwise, (6)
sTxy(t) = e
−βT i, (7)
where, i is the time passed after payment deadline and βT is the time sensitivity
parameter of timely payment. Therefore, a buyer’s trustworthiness is reduced
with its delay in payment and βT varies with the sellers’ business policy. If a
seller sets a large value for βT , the buyer’s reputation in terms of timely payment345
decreases rapidly with the number of overdue days and vice versa. Now, sDxy(t)
can be calculated as:
sDxy(t) =

τu
τc
if τu ≤ τc
1 otherwise ,
(8)
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where, τc is the contract duration from the seller and τu is the active time of
the buyer under the contract. Finally, the total experience of a seller can be
calculated considering the past experiences using an exponential moving average350
(EMA) as:
ζxy(t) =
αeζ
c
xy(t) + (1− αe)ζxy(t− 1) if t > 1
ζcxy(t) otherwise,
(9)
where, αe is a weight factor between 0 and 1, and t represents a trading episode
within a particular window of episodes. Larger weight factors give more impor-
tance to the recent experience, whereas smaller values of αe would take past
experiences as well. For exponential moving average, αe can be represented in355
terms of W , i.e., αe = 2/(W + 1), where, W is the window size. Seller y can
forward ζxy(t) to others requiring recommendations. The receiving seller can
use it in calculating its own reputation value for buyer x.
As shown in Fig. 2, a seller can have reliability of a buyer either from a
reliability broker or using our proposed model. In case of the latter, a seller360
can obtain recommendations about a buyer from different sources, e.g., referred
recommenders, public social networks, list of blacklisted buyers and other rec-
ommenders. The concept of referencing is used in many cases, especially in job
applications where the employee can collect and verify information about the
applicant from referred recommenders. Public social networks, such as, face-365
book, twitter, can also become means of collecting recommendations based on
text-analysis or page ranks [46]. A seller may also collect information on a
prospective buyer from a member of its own loyalty club if the buyer is known
to that member. Blacklisted buyers are also a very good source for a seller to
know about the fraudulent buyers. Although a seller can collect recommenda-370
tions from these various sources, it is out of the scope of this paper to explore all
possible ways. For ease of calculation and simplicity, in the remaining sections,
we assume that a seller will obtain recommendations about a buyer from any
such sources, and they are, in general, termed as recommenders.
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Seller calculates 
reliability of buyer
Seller calculates 
reputation of buyer
Credit score
of buyer
Start
End
Acceptable?
Yes
Select candidate
Buyer
Buyer Submits 
Demand for Spectrum 
to a seller
No
Buyer’s 
financial profile
Reject Buyer
Recommendations
Past trading
experience
Confidence level 
about the buyer
Trustworthiness 
of recommenders
Referred
recommenders
Public social 
networks
List of blacklisted 
buyers
Other 
recommenders
Yes
Reliability broker
Reliability 
available to a 
broker?
No
Figure 2: Buyer selection process executed by each seller.
4.2.2. Trustworthiness of Recommenders375
A recommender’s trustworthiness depends on the length of exposure with
a buyer and its recommendation compared to other recommenders’ recommen-
dations. Therefore, the current trustworthiness of the recommender j can be
defined as:
φcxj(t) =
ηxj
max
∀j
(ηxj)
(
1−
∣∣∣ζ˜x(t)− ζxj(t)∣∣∣) , (10)
where, ηxj is the number of trades the recommender j had with the buyer x; ζ˜x380
is the median of all the recommendations for buyer x, and φcxj(t) represents the
most recent trustworthiness score. To incorporate the previous trustworthiness
16
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scores of a recommender, φxj(t) can be calculated using EMA as follows:
φxj(t) =
αeφ
c
xj(t) + (1− αe)φxj(t− 1) if t > 1
φcxj(t) otherwise.
(11)
When a trade ends, the trustworthiness of a recommender will be updated
using (11). This update allows the model to filter out any false recommender385
in future trading because φxj below a certain predefined value is not considered
in the calculation of (3). Fig. 2 shows the candidate buyer selection process of
the proposed model.
5. Price Modelling through Seller Competition
If the sellers are aware of the prices (per unit bandwidth) of other sellers and390
they compete with each other in maximizing their own profits, non-cooperative
game theory is an appropriate choice to model this price competition. Therefore,
in this paper, we adopted non-cooperative game theory to determine the pricing
solution.
In [15], we proposed a market scenario where a buyer considers trading with395
a potential seller on the expectation of fulfilling certain requirements from the
seller in terms of the following metrics: reputation of a seller y to buyer x, ρxy;
advertised SNR offered by the seller to the buyer, γxy; bandwidth offered for
sale, by; available service duration, τay and spectrum price, pxy. The perceived
reputation ρxy of seller y can be either obtained from a reputation broker as400
described in the previous section or the buyer itself can calculate it utilizing a
reputation and trustworthiness modelling that employs its own experience [15].
A buyer may not consider sellers if certain requirements are not met, e.g., sellers
with reputation and SNR below certain level.
Besides, a buyer may have other requirements to select spectrum from a405
seller. For example, Weiss et al. [47] mentioned that spectrum is not suitable
for fungibility because of the various characteristics of spectrum in spatial and
temporal dimensions. Besides, some technological as well as other requirements
17
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may also impact spectrum fungibility. In [15], we integrated the temporal aspect
of fungibility by considering the available service duration, τay of the offered410
spectrum of seller y. Spectrum SNR also includes the technological fungibility
in our model. Following [47], below we consider the spatial aspect of spectrum
fungibility.
If fx is the required frequency of buyer x and fy is the offered frequency
of seller y for bandwidth by, the probabilistic spatial fungibility score for this415
spectrum is defined as
Sxy = min
(
fx
fy
, 1
)
. (12)
If fy < fx, greater coverage can be achieved with fy [47] and Sxy = 1.
Now, a buyer filters out unsuitable sellers and selects only the set of sellers
using buyer-specific requirement criteria, like ρminxy ≤ ρxy ≤ ρmaxxy , by ≥ bminy ,420
γminxy ≤ γxy ≤ γmaxxy , τay ≥ τminay and Sxy ≥ Sminxy that a seller must satisfy.
We denote these chosen sellers by buyer x as a set =x. Buyers request the
pricing information to the selected sellers. Once =x is determined, we apply
the following modelling to determine price through competition among sellers
y ∈ =x.425
The profit of each primary service provider, i.e., seller can be defined as
the revenue earned from serving primary users, the revenue gained by sharing
spectrum with secondary users and the cost for sharing the bandwidth. We
thus define the supply function (i.e., profit) for primary provider (i.e., seller) y
as follows:430
ϕby (P) = ny log
(
By − by
ny
)
+ ℵxypxyby − byC (P), (13)
where, C (P) is the cost function of primary service provider; P = {pxy | y ∈ =x}
is the set of strategies (i.e., prices) of the selected primary service providers; ny
is the number of primary users under a primary service provider; By is the total
bandwidth of primary provider y and by is the bandwidth for sale. Incorporating
18
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the pricing information of other sellers, the cost function C (P) is defined as [11]435
C (P) = k1 + k2
 ∑
pxy∈P
pxy
αc , (14)
where, k1, k2 and αc are non-negative constants. Here, αc ≥ 1 so that the cost
function is convex and 0 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ 1.
For a secondary service provider (i.e., buyer), profit can be defined as the
difference between the satisfaction or utility earned from using the bandwidth
from a seller and the price paid for the bandwidth. Therefore, the demand440
function or profit of a buyer can be written as:
Pbx = nxρxy log
(
bx
nx
log2 (1 + γxy)
)
gxy(τay, τr)
− pxybx,
(15)
where, bx is the bandwidth sought by buyer x; nx is the number of secondary
users under a secondary service provider; gxy(τa, τr) is the utility function for
the required contract duration and τr is the duration required by the secondary
provider. The two logarithmic functions are used in (15) for two completely445
different purposes. The inside log(.) is used to represent the mean throughput
using Shannon capacity model defined by
(
bx
nx
log2 (1 + γxy)
)
. If we omit the
inside log(.), then the term bxnx indicates mean bandwidth which could also be
used instead of the mean throughput. But we prefer to use
(
bx
nx
log2 (1 + γxy)
)
,
i.e., mean throughput, as the parameter of the outer log(.) function to include450
the channel quality of the bandwidth offered by a seller. On the other hand,
the outer log(.) is used to reflect the diminishing property of marginal utility
which indicates that the marginal utility decreases as the demand of the product
increases. Here, the marginal utility of a product or service represents the change
in utility with an increase (or decrease) in the consumption of that product or455
service [48]. Therefore, the outer log(.) function ensures that the diminishing
property of marginal utility of economics is reflected.
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Here, gxy(τa, τr) can be defined as in [15]:
gxy(τa, τr) =
e
−β(τr−τa)/τr if τr ≥ τa
1 otherwise.
(16)
Differentiating (15) with respect to bandwidth yields marginal demand or
profit function (Dbx) of the secondary provider. Putting
∂Pbx
∂bx
= 0 leads to:460
Dbx = bx = gxy(τay, τr)
nxρxy
pxy
. (17)
Bandwidth size by of the profit function (13) can be replaced by the required
bandwidth or bandwidth demand Dbx of (17). Using (14) and (17), (13) can be
rearranged as :
ϕby (P) = ny log
(
By
ny
− nxρxygxy(τay, τr)
nypxy
)
+ nxρxygxy(τay, τr)
.
ℵxy − k1 + k2
(∑
pxy∈P pxy
)αc
pxy
 . (18)
Now using
∂ϕby (P)
∂pxy
,
∂ϕby (P)
∂pxy
=
nynxρxygxy(τay, τr)
pxy
(
Bypxy − nxρxygxy(τay, τr)
)
− nxρxygxy(τay, τr)
p2xy
.
pxyαck2
 ∑
pxy∈P
pxy
αc−1
−k1 − k2
 ∑
pxy∈P
pxy
αc .
(19)
The Nash equilibrium solution p∗xy can be obtained from (19) by solving465
for all y. The spectrum size can then be obtained from Dbx for all values
20
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of P∗. It is impractical due to high communication overhead for the primary
service providers or sellers to obtain the pricing information and profits of all
other sellers. But a seller can observe the adaptation of bandwidth demand by
secondary service providers or buyers in response to the seller’s pricing strategy.470
If buyers’ demand decreases due to the seller’s price increase, it indicates that
other sellers’ prices are lower. Then, the seller will also decrease the price. This
adaptation of price will continue iteratively until the Nash equilibrium price is
achieved. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can be obtained for each seller based on
the bandwidth demand from buyers. Each seller will try to maximize its profit475
by adjusting its spectrum pricing based on the marginal profit function of (19).
Therefore, a seller’s price adjustment strategy can be modeled as a dynamic
game as follows:
pxy(t+ 1) = pxy(t) + σ
∂ϕby (P)
∂pxy(t)
, (20)
where, σ is the learning rate which acts as a weighting factor and its impact
on reaching the equilibrium price is detailed in Section 7.2.7. Assuming prices480
to be the strategies of the players (i.e., sellers), the Nash equilibrium can be
obtained by using the best response function which implies the best price of one
seller given other’s prices. The best response function of seller y (i.e., the best
price pxy of seller y) based on the set of prices P−y = {pxj | j 6= y} offered by
other sellers, can be defined as follows:485
Fy(P−y) = arg max
pxy
ϕby (P = {pxy} ∪ P−y) . (21)
The vector P∗ represents the Nash equilibrium solution and can be defined
as:
P∗ = {p∗xy | p∗xy = Fy(P∗−y),∀y}. (22)
21
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6. Bandwidth Trading
In this paper, we have modeled two types of buyers: (i) price sensitive
and (ii) price insensitive. Price sensitive buyers are the ones who maximize490
their utility considering their budget constraint while price insensitive buyers
maximize their utility through satisfying their bandwidth requirements. After
selecting a list of candidate sellers =x who meet the specified requirement criteria
of a buyer as detailed in Section 5 and obtaining the Nash equilibrium prices of
the selected sellers using game theory, a buyer will buy the amount of bandwidth495
that maximizes its utility function satisfying its budget constraint or bandwidth
requirements.
For the price sensitive buyer, the objective function can be written as:
Determine b
Maximize
ux(b) =
∑
y∈=x
nxρxy log
(
by
nx
log2 (1 + γxy)
)
.e−β(τr−τay )/τr
subject to ∑
y∈=x
p∗xyby ≤ Ix, (23)
where, b is the set of bandwidths a buyer wants to buy; β is a constant which
was numerically derived in [15], and Ix is the budget constraint.
We can solve (23) (Appendix A for details) to find the optimized amount of500
bandwidth by for the price sensitive buyer to buy from seller y to maximize its
objective function:
by =
Ixρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr
pxy
∑
y∈=x ρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr
. (24)
If a buyer is not price sensitive (i.e., not having constraint on budget), it
will focus on obtaining its required bandwidth of higher quality from highly
22
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reputable sellers. For price insensitive buyers, the problem can be formulated
as:
Determine b
Maximize
ux(b) =
∑
y∈=x
nxρxy log
(
by
nx
log2 (1 + γxy)
)
.e−β(τr−τay )/τr
subject to ∑
y∈=x
by = Rx, (25)
where, Rx is the total bandwidth requirement.
In a similar way adopted for (23), we can also find the optimum amount of505
bandwidth by to buy from seller y for a price insensitive buyer by solving (25):
by =
Rxnxρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr∑
y∈=x ρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr
. (26)
Based on the Nash equilibrium pricing information P∗ obtained in (22),
buyers, such as price sensitive buyers, will calculate analytically the amount of
bandwidth it should buy from seller(s) within its budget constraint using (24).510
Similarly, price insensitive buyers will select the seller(s) to buy from and the
corresponding bandwidth size from each using (26).
Although optimum bandwidth is obtained using the analytical solutions in
(24) and (26), the calculated bandwidth from a seller may be less than the
minimum amount a buyer want to buy from any seller, i.e., by ≤ bminy . In515
that case, a buyer will calculate bandwidth from the remaining sellers and start
trading.
Algorithm 1 describes the steps involving in the proposed spectrum trading
model. The local stability analysis of the model is provided in Appendix B.
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Algorithm 1 Trading Algorithm
1: for all buyers, buyer x observes the offered prices, p = {pxy | y ∈ Ny} of all
sellers, where Ny represent the set of all sellers;
2: buyer x collects reputation ρxy of seller y from a broker or calculates as in
[15];
3: buyer x selects a set of sellers,
=′x = {y | ρminxy ≤ ρxy ≤ ρmaxxy , γminxy ≤ γxy ≤ γmaxxy ,
by ≥ bminy , τay ≥ τminay , Sxy ≥ Sminxy };
4: seller y collects reliability ℵxy of buyer x from a broker or calculates using
(1);
5: seller selects a set of buyers,
=y =
{
x | ℵxy > ℵminxy
}
;
6: buyer x forms =x =
{
y | a seller in =′x that accepts x for ℵxy > ℵminxy
}
;
7: y ← 0;
8: repeat
9: y ← y + 1, t← 0;
10: calculate price pxy(t+ 1) using (20);
11: while |pxy(t+ 1)− pxy(t)| > ε do
12: t← t+ 1;
13: update price pxy(t+ 1) using (20);
14: end while
15: until y ≤ |=x|
16: above gives p∗ and price sensitive buyers buy bandwidth b at p∗ using (24)
and price insensitive buyers using (26);
17: calculate buyer’s own experience and update recommender’s trustworthiness
as in [15];
18: calculate seller’s own experience using (9) and update other recommenders’
trustworthiness using (11).
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7. Performance Evaluation520
7.1. Experimental Setup
Performance evaluation and numerical simulation for comparative analyses
have been carried out using Matlab R2012b. We have considered a dynamic
spectrum sharing scenario with 10 primary service providers (sellers) each hav-
ing a bandwidth of 20 MHz and 20 secondary service providers (buyers). Each525
of the primary and secondary services are considered to have 10 primary and
10 secondary users, respectively. Results are obtained from the average of 100
runs for each individual primary services. Reputation of the primary services is
considered to be in the range from 0.1 to 1 and SNR is assumed to be from 1 to
35 dB. In our simulation, reliability of a buyer or reputation of a seller is taken530
from a broker with probability 0.4, i.e., with probability 0.6, it is calculated by
the entity itself using our model.
7.2. Numerical Results
7.2.1. Best Response and Nash Equilibrium
As a representative example, the best response of two primary providers or535
sellers is shown in Fig. 3. However, all the results are using 10 sellers. The best
response of one seller is a function of the other’s strategy (e.g., price setting). In
other words, the best response is the best price p1,1 of Seller 1 when this seller
knows the best price p1,2 of Seller 2 (both offering price to Buyer 1), and vice
versa. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is found where the two best responses540
intersect. If the price of one seller increases, the price of the other seller also
increases. Evidently, the price of one seller impacts the price of another seller
which implies that in a competitive market, a seller’s profit depends on that of
other sellers as well. Similar results are observed for multiple sellers.
7.2.2. Marginal Profit545
Figure 4 shows the impact of seller’s reputation ρxy, available contract du-
ration τay and αc (constant related to the cost function defined in (14)) on the
25
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Figure 3: Best response function and Nash equilibrium for two sellers.
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Figure 4: Marginal profit of sellers with different values of reputation, available contract
duration and αc.
marginal profit of sellers. Marginal profit increases for higher values of reputa-
tion because a higher reputation creates more demand from buyers. Similarly,
longer available contract duration creates higher demand from buyers. With550
increasing αc, marginal profit increases but for αc above 0.8, profit starts to
decline.
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Figure 5: Seller’s profit based on a buyer’s reputation.
7.2.3. Buyer’s Reputation and Trustworthiness
As mentioned before, a seller’s profit depends on its buyers’ reputation if
the sale is on lease. We can calculate a buyer’s reputation using (3) which555
depends on the confidence level of seller’s experiences, other recommenders’
recommendations, buyer’s past payment completion status, timely payments
and contract durations. Then, seller’s normalized profit is calculated using (19)
which is shown in Fig. 5. It reveals that for leasing based contracts, selecting a
reputed buyer is also important for a seller.560
Fig. 6 shows a comparison of seller’s profit with and without considering
buyer’s reliability. In [15], we considered only the seller’s reputation. In this
paper, we consider buyer’s credit scoring and reputation to determine its reli-
ability in order to reduce the loss of profit of a seller. It is observed from the
figure that if buyers’ reliability is considered, a seller’s profit is increased. How-565
ever, if buyers’ reliability is not considered (as in [15]), a seller may choose a less
reliable buyer, and therefore, makes less profit due to an incomplete payment
or termination of the contract.
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Figure 6: Seller’s profit comparison with and without reliability of buyers.
7.2.4. Throughput Calculation
Assuming additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver, through-
put can be defined as the number of payload bits per second received correctly
[49]:
Throughput, Ψ =
KR
L
(
1− 1
2
e−γ/2
)
, (27)
where, L is the packet size in bits; R is the transmission rate in bits/sec and K570
is the payload size in bits.
Advertised SNR or the initial SNR may not prevail throughout the whole
trading period. Since our reputation model is built upon the consistency of the
received SNR which is measured from the buyer’s own and recommenders’ trad-
ing experience, a buyer tends to select a reliable seller for which the throughput575
will be higher. Therefore, to assess the impact of the seller’s reputation, av-
erage throughput is calculated using (27) and compared between the proposed
model and MCCPSS (market-equilibrium, competitive and cooperative pric-
ing for spectrum sharing) [17] which is shown in Fig. 7. Our game theoretic
modelling of spectrum trading has been compared to MCCPSS [17] because580
MCCPSS also uses game theory in pricing solution. Since reputation is not
incorporated in MCCPSS, buyers may select a seller with inconsistent SNR
or whose channel may become congested during the trading period resulting
28
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Figure 7: Impact of seller’s reputation on average throughput of the spectrum buyers.
in lower throughput, whereas the proposed model assists the buyers to select
sellers with consistent SNR, ensuring higher average throughput.585
Fig. 8 shows a comparison of the profit or benefit of spectrum buyers in
terms of the ratio of Nash equilibrium price to throughput between the proposed
model and MCCPSS [17]. The randomness in the ratio output of this figure is
due to the variations in the obtained Nash equilibrium prices from different
sellers. The price to throughput ratio is always less in our proposed model,590
which implies that our proposed model provides more benefit to the buyers.
Since the spectrum buyers in our model select higher quality spectrum from
highly demanded sellers, it results in higher throughput.
7.2.5. Price Sensitive and Insensitive Buyers
Table 1 shows the traded bandwidth of price sensitive buyers from different595
sellers with different requirements. It can be observed from the table that Buyer
1’s maximum limit of reputation requirement is 1 whereas it is 0.8 for Buyer
2. Buyer 2’s other requirements are similar to the requirements of Buyer 1.
Since Buyer 2 has selected less requirement for reputation, it can purchase more
bandwidth (7.44 vs 7.15 MHz) with the same budget constraint because of less600
price per unit bandwidth for less reputed seller. Buyer 3’s budget requirement
29
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Spectrum buyers
N
as
h 
Eq
ui
lib
riu
m
 p
ric
e:
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t
R
at
io
 
 
MCCPSS
Proposed Model
Figure 8: The ratio of Nash equilibrium price to throughput between the proposed model and
MCCPSS [17] for different users.
is less than Buyers 1 and 2, therefore, Buyer 3 purchases less bandwidth than
the others. In each case, within the budget constraint, a buyer buys more
bandwidth from a reputed seller than a less reputed seller.
Traded bandwidth for price insensitive buyers is shown in Table 2. Buyer 5605
sets an upper limit for reputation at 0.8, less than that of Buyer 4. Therefore,
Buyer 5 does not select a seller with reputation greater than 0.8, e.g., 0.9, as
shown in Table 2. Then Buyer 5 can buy the same total bandwidth of 10 MHz
for a lower price (20.30 vs 21.14 price unit) compared to Buyer 4. Thus, a buyer
can have different types of filtering requirements based on its policy in selecting610
sellers to buy more bandwidth or spend less in buying the spectrum resources.
7.2.6. Profit Comparison
Figure 9 illustrates the profit of sellers by serving own primary users and
sharing spectrum with the secondary providers or buyers. If the price per unit
bandwidth is increased, the profit of the seller or primary service provider also615
increases and then tends to become saturated due to the lower demand from
buyers. The Nash equilibrium was found where both the profits intersect.
The sellers with higher reputation have higher demands from buyers. The
increased demand also causes the price of the product to increase resulting in
30
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Table 1: Traded bandwidth of price sensitive buyers
Price Sensitive Buyer 1
Ix
Seller Selection
Criteria
Selected Sellers Purchased
Bandwidth
Spent
ρ1y γ1y τay p1y S1y
15
0.5 ≤ ρ1y ≤ 1,
22 ≤ γ1y ≤ 35,
τay ≥ 7, S1y ≥ 0.7
0.9 32 36 2.3 0.9 2.02 4.66
0.8 29 27 2.2 1.0 1.88 4.14
0.7 28 34 2.0 1.0 1.81 3.62
0.5 26 25 1.8 0.9 1.44 2.59
Total 7.15 15
Price Sensitive Buyer 2
Ix
Seller Selection
Criteria
Selected Sellers Purchased
Bandwidth
Spent
ρ2y γ2y τay p2y S2y
15
0.5 ≤ ρ2y ≤ 0.8,
22 ≤ γ2y ≤ 35,
τay ≥ 7, S2y ≥ 0.7
0.8 29 27 2.2 0.9 2.73 6.00
0.7 28 34 2.0 1.0 2.63 5.25
0.5 26 25 1.8 1.0 2.08 3.75
Total 7.44 15
Price Sensitive Buyer 3
Ix
Seller Selection
Criteria
Selected Sellers Purchased
Bandwidth
Spent
ρ3y γ3y τay p3y S3y
12
0.5 ≤ ρ3y ≤ 0.8,
20 ≤ γ3y ≤ 30,
τay ≥ 4, S3y ≥ 0.8
0.8 29 27 2.2 1.0 2.18 4.80
0.7 28 34 2.0 0.9 2.10 4.20
0.5 26 25 1.8 0.8 1.67 3.00
Total 5.95 12
more profits for the seller. In Fig. 10, the profit of a primary service provider620
(i.e., seller) is calculated with an increasing order of reputation. Since higher
reputation causes higher demand, a highly reputed seller earns higher profit
31
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Table 2: Traded bandwidth of price insensitive buyers
Price Insensitive Buyer 4
Rx
Seller Selection
Criteria
Selected Sellers Purchased
Bandwidth
Spent
ρ4y γ4y τay p4y S4y
10
0.5 ≤ ρ4y ≤ 1,
25 ≤ γ4y ≤ 35,
τay ≥ 7, S4y ≥ 0.8
0.9 32 36 2.3 0.9 3.10 7.14
0.8 29 27 2.2 0.9 2.76 6.07
0.7 28 34 2.0 1.0 2.41 4.83
0.5 26 25 1.8 1.0 1.72 3.10
Total 10 21.14
Price Insensitive Buyer 5
Rx
Seller Selection
Criteria
Selected Sellers Purchased
Bandwidth
Spent
ρ5y γ5y τay p5y S5y
10
0.5 ≤ ρ5y ≤ 0.8,
24 ≤ γ5y ≤ 32,
τay ≥ 5, S5y ≥ 0.9
0.8 29 27 2.2 1.0 4.0 8.80
0.7 28 34 2.0 1.0 3.5 7.00
0.5 26 25 1.8 1.0 2.5 4.50
Total 10 20.30
which is shown in this figure. In comparison, a buyer selects a seller in MCCPSS
without consideration of reputation. Therefore, highly reputed sellers may earn
lower profits than other sellers due to the absence of any reputation system in625
MCCPSS.
Caicedo and Weiss [50] found in their study that spectrum market is not
viable with few numbers of buyers and sellers such as less than five. However,
their observation was based on the spectrum auction market. In auction, the
market is successful for higher number of buyers and consequently with fewer630
buyers, it is less viable. But our approach in this paper is different from the
auction market. In our model, price is based on supply and demand, and equi-
librium is reached based on the price adaptation dynamically, and therefore,
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Figure 9: Profit of sellers for different values of price.
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Figure 10: Profit comparison of a seller between the proposed model and MCCPSS [17],
respectively.
is applicable for any number of trading partners. Also the number of buyers
and sellers in many countries are more than 10 (such as in India [51]), and this635
number is expected to grow in future due to ever increasing bandwidth demand.
7.2.7. Stability Analysis
Learning rate can affect the convergence to Nash equilibrium price which
is shown in the local bifurcation analysis [52] of Fig. 11. If the learning rate
is small, the algorithm can reach a unique Nash equilibrium price. For this640
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Figure 11: Bifurcation diagram of seller 1 showing the equilibrium price with different learning
rates.
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Figure 12: Lyapunov exponent and learning rate.
particular experiment, learning rate σ1 > 0.22 exhibits that price fluctuates
between two prices. If the learning rate is increased further, the price varies in
multiple values and never converges to a single equilibrium value.
Stability of a system in terms of chaos can also be analyzed using the Lya-
punov exponent [53]. A positive Lyapunov exponent indicates chaos and it645
determines the average exponential rate of separation of two nearby initial con-
ditions, or the average stretching of the space. Considering two nearby initial
34
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points at p0 and p0 + δp0 in pn+1 = f(pn), the points are separated after one
iteration by:
δp1 = f (p0 + δp0)− f (p0) ' δp0f ′(p0). (28)
Local Lyapunov exponent λ at p0 can be defined as:650
eλ = |δp1/δp0|, (29)
λ = ln |δp1/δp0| ' ln|f ′(p0)|. (30)
Global Lyapunov exponent can then be found by:
λ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
ln|f ′(pn)|. (31)
Figure 12 shows the Lyapunov exponent for different values of the learning
rate σ1 with the adaptation of price. For small values of σ1, the system reaches
the equilibrium because the value of λ remains less than 0. When λ ≥ 0 for
large values of σ1, the system indicates instability or chaos.655
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a spectrum trading model for cognitive radio net-
works where there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Competition among
sellers is modeled using game theory. The Nash equilibrium is obtained dy-
namically to find the optimal price of the spectrum for each seller. Sellers660
dynamically adjust their pricing strategy based on the marginal profit calcu-
lated from the demands of buyers. Sellers are also able to select suitable buyers
based on buyers’ creditworthiness and reputation in order to secure long term
trading contracts. Reputation/reliability of sellers or buyers can be obtained
from reputation brokerage service or calculated using our model. Using the665
Nash equilibrium price, price sensitive and insensitive buyers calculate the opti-
mum amount of spectrum to buy. Buyers also employ reputation as a criterion
35
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to evaluate sellers and use recommendations from other buyers to find the best
seller(s) in order to maximize throughput. Stability of the dynamic game used
by the sellers is analyzed using local stability theory. Experimental results re-670
veal that our proposed model performs better both in producing higher profits
for the reputed sellers and higher throughput and lower price to throughput
ratio for buyers.
Appendix A. Optimum Bandwidth Considering Price Sensitivity
To obtain an analytical solution of (23), it can be rewritten using a Lagrange675
multiplier,
u(b, λ1) =
∑
y∈=x
nxρxy log
(
by
nx
log2 (1 + γy)
)
.e−β(τr−τay )/τr − λ1
∑
y∈=x
pxyby − Ix
 . (A.1)
Other related constraints on meeting the minimum requirements as discussed
earlier are considered to filter out unsuitable sellers before optimization. Now,
(b, λ1) is stationary for u(b, λ1) only if ∇b,λ1u(b, λ1) = 0. Setting this gradient
equal to zero yields680
∂u
∂by
=
1
by
nxρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr − λ1pxy = 0, (A.2)
∂u
∂λ1
=
∑
y∈=x
pxyby − Ix = 0. (A.3)
Using (A.2),
by =
1
λ1pxy
nxρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr . (A.4)
From (A.3), ∑
y∈=x
pxyby = Ix, (A.5)
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which leads to,
λ1 =
nx
Ix
∑
y∈=x
ρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr . (A.6)
Using (A.4) and (A.6),
by =
Ixρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr
pxy
∑
y∈=x ρxye
−β(τr−τay )/τr
, (A.7)
where, by is the optimized amount of bandwidth to buy from seller y to maximize
its objective function.
Eq. (25) can be similarly solved to calculate the optimum bandwidth for685
price insensitive buyer.
Appendix B. Local Stability Analysis
A fixed point in the solution space is stable if the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix are strictly inside the unit circle [11], [14]. Here, we can determine the
stability at the fixed point of equilibrium price pxy from (20). Here, we define
the Jacobian matrix of two primary services as:
J =
 ∂p1[t+1]∂p1[t] ∂p1[t+1]∂p2[t]
∂p2[t+1]
∂p1[t]
∂p2[t+1]
∂p2[t]

=
 J11 J12
J21 J22
 ,
(B.1)
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where,
J11 =1− σ1n1ρ1gxy
[
m1 (2B1p1 − n1ρ1gxy)
(B1p21 − n1ρ1gxyp1)2
+
α(α− 1)k2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α−2
p1
−
2αk2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α−1
p21
+
2
(
k1 + k2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α)
p31
]
,
(B.2)
J12 =
1
p21
σ1n1ρ1gxyαk2(2p1 − αp1 + p2)
∑
pj∈P
pj
α−2 , (B.3)
J21 =
1
p22
σ2n2ρ2gxyαk2(2p2 − αp2 + p1)
∑
pj∈P
pj
α−2 , (B.4)
J22 =1− σ2n2ρ2gxy
[
m2 (2B2p2 − n2ρ2gxy)
(B2p22 − n2ρ2gxyp2)2
+
α(α− 1)k2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α−2
p2
−
2αk2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α−1
p22
+
2
(
k1 + k2
(∑
pj∈P pj
)α)
p32
]
.
(B.5)
Since the matrix is neither diagonal nor triangular, eigenvalues of this matrix
can be calculated from the characteristic equation which can be written as:
λ2 − λ(J11 + J22) + (J11J22 − J12J21) = 0. Therefore, the eigenvalues of this690
matrix are:
(λ1, λ2) =
(J11 + J22)±
√
(J11 − J22)2 + 4J12J21
2
. (B.6)
A fixed point pxy is stable if and only if the eigenvalues (λ1, λ2) are all inside
the unit circle of the complex plane (i.e., |λi| < 1).
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